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A masterpiece of scholarship

Mediterranean social change revisited

A great primer on Mao-era economicsFor such a short book, a reader will come away with a solid understanding of not just the policies, but how they affected the Chinese peasants on a grassroots level.


What an inspiration!

Excellent large book for library use.

Book DescriptionDr. Johnson was not only one of the great religious personalities of the time but was also known as a political observer of surpassing authority. Based on his first-hand experiences, the Dean's long journeys from Moscow northward to Leningrad, southward to Stalingrad, still farther southward to the Republics of Armenia and Georgia, and then still farther eastward to Asiatic Tashkent and Samarkand. Dr. Johnson set down, not just opinion, but every fact that might throw a revealing light on his basic belief that "if it is Russia's responsibility to understand us, it is our responsibility to understand Russia."
...this text refers to the 1974 Hardcover Edition published by Boni & Gaer, NY.


IndispensableWhat makes Graham's book so important is that it shows that this story is not true. It is not entirely untrue, as we will see. But most important, Negrin was not a Communist. He was not a puppet, he was not a stooge, and he was not a weakling. He was fundamentally a liberal who sought to encourage political pluralism and a market economy. At the beginning of the war he sought, at great personal risk to himself, to prevent the nightly "patrols" from randomly killing suspected rebels. He tried to restore freedom of worship in Spain, after revolutionaries had burned many churches and slaughtered much of the clergy. He opposed proposals to amalgamate the Socialist and Communist parties at a time when many Socialists, who would later denounce him as a Communist puppet, favored the idea. Contra much received opinion his ascension to power was not a Communist plot. Originally the Communists simply wanted Largo Caballero to give up the war ministry, where he showed precious little imagination or vigor or competence. When Largo Caballero left, it was because of the united opposition of the Communists, Right Socialists and Liberal Republicans. It is true that the Communists murdered Andreas Nin, the head of the POUM, and that Negrin had little choice but to accept this. And it is also true that security services and military tribunals arrested people arbitrarily or shot soldiers for desertion. But this was not the realization of the Republic's "totalitarian" or "Stalinist" essence, but the desperate struggle of a Republic trying to stay alive at any cost. Although the POUM was made a scapegoat, the anarchists, liberals, regionalists and anti-Negrin Socialists existed to the end, destroyed not by the Soviet Union, but by the Falange.
This leads to a larger problem. The various forces that made up the Republican government, Socialists, Anarchists, Liberals, Catalan and Basque nationalists and autonomists, Trotskyist and Communists all had vociferous constituencies. What they did not have was mass mobilization that could successfully prepare the grounds for a fully modern polity or fight a total war. What political activities they did conduct were marred by clientalism and factionalism. Largo Caballero had spent much of the thirties posturing and preening as the fighter for revolution. But when the moment of truth arose, both in 1934 and 1936 he botched it. Yet he actively prevented more moderate Socialists from working a compromise with liberals that might have strengthened the Spanish Republic. (We also learn that POUM was not the pure martyr of libertarian communism, but a coalition of moderate and radical left-wingers.)
Although Graham is often very critical of how the Negrin cabinet sought to centralize the government at the expense of regional autonomy, or how the attempt to reverse collectivization often made things worse, she reminds us that there was no real alternative to his proposals. When the Basques were overwhelmed by Franco, their relatively conservative leadership let Basque industry fall into Falangist hands instead of destroying it. Collectivization was sometimes popular, but it was also sometimes very unpopular. It had tendencies to autarky and could not provide the food the Republic so desperately needed, especially since much of the collectivized land had never produced that much food in the first place. And most important, there is the discussion of the final months of the war. The Republic not only faced imminent defeat, but the slaughter of many of it supporters by the vengeful and cruel Falange. Negrin's strategy was to fight on, to hope that if they fought on long enough, Britain and France would recognize the need for anti-Fascist unity and try to help them or broker a ceasefire. As that hope slowly and painfully died, Negrin realized that continued resistance was the only card he had against Franco's vengeance. But facing imminent defeat many Loyalists believed that if they gave up and sacrificed the Communists they would get a kinder peace. In this they were painfully wrong. Once they helped overthrow Negrin and replace him with the military man Casado, Franco demanded, and got, their surrender. Many of the Casadoists would then be shot by the Caudillo. At the beginning of the war the British navy on its own initiative rescued many of the wealthy and prosperous inconvenienced by the Nationalist coup. At the end the British government would not lift a finger to help evacuate people fighting for values that the British Conservative Party thinks it had a monopoly on. There is a grim power in the final pages as we see the Republic garrotted to death.


Excellant piece of work

A Great book about a great man

Giving You What You Need.